Auditing policies and information
Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné and
No 86, Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings from Econometric Society
We first point out that, using any of the current criteria for comparing information systems in principal-agent models with moral hazard (such as Kim (1994)'s criterion), it is often impossible to contrast the value of information obtained from different policies of contingent audits that bear the same cost. Given two such policies A and B where, say, the lower cumulated frequencies of audits are always larger under B than under A, we show, however, that the likelihood ratio distribution associated with A dominates the one associated with B in the third order. A new, strictly finer, ranking of information systems then implies that the value of information is greater under A than under B when the agent's negative inverse utility function exhibits some prudence. The practical upshot is that the design of auditing policies involves somewhat more than the classical tradeoff between risk and incentives; it also requires to balance incentives and downside risk.
Keywords: Principal-agent; moral hazard; value of information; likelihood ratio distribution; third-order stochastic dominance; prudence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:nawm04:86
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings from Econometric Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().