Networks of Collaboration in Oligopoly

Sumit Joshi

No 623, Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers from Econometric Society

Abstract: In an oligopoly, prior to choosing quantities/prices, each firm has an opportunity to form pair-wise collaborative links with other firms. These pair-wise links lower costs of production of the firms which form a link. The collection of pair-wise links defines a collaboration network. We study stable and efficient networks under different types of market competition. We find that except under extreme competition, a la Bertrand, firms have an incentive to collaborate wit their competitors to lower costs of production. We find that two simple architectures, the complete network, where every firm has a collaboration link with every other firm, and the network with a dominant group, which contains a large number of completely connected firms and several isolated firms, are stable under different market conditions. We also observe that stable networks are often efficient from a social point of view.

Date: 2000-08-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Downloads: (external link)
http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/0623a.pdf main text (application/pdf)
http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/0623b.pdf main text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Networks of collaboration in oligopoly (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0623

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers from Econometric Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().