Expropriation and Incentives for Team Production
Zhigang Tao () and
Changqi Wu ()
No 807, Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers from Econometric Society
Recent research suggests that expropriation by controlling shareholders of other shareholders is an important problem in both publicly held and closely held firms. This paper examines how partners in closely held firms can make control-right arrangements to mitigate expropriation and other incentive problems. We further analyze the interaction between revenue-sharing contracts and control-right arrangements and investigate how the former also helps in dealing with the aforementioned set of problems. Our theoretical results are consistent with the stylized facts that we find from a sample of 200 joint-venture contracts.
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