Mechanism Design in Queueing Problems
Manipushpak Mitra ()
No 1301, Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers from Econometric Society
A well-known result in incentive theory is that for a very broad class of decision problems, there is no mechanism which achieves truth-telling in dominant strategies, efficiency and budget balancedness (or first best implementability). On the contrary, Mitra and Sen (1998), prove that linear cost queueing models are first best implementable. This paper is an attempt at identification of cost structures for which queueing models are first best implementable. The broad conclusion is that, this is a fairly large class. Some of these first best implementable models can be implemented by mechanisms that satisfy individually rationality.
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Journal Article: Mechanism design in queueing problems (2001)
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