Self-Selection Consistent Choices

Salvador Barberà () and Carmen Bevia ()

No 1322, Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers from Econometric Society

Abstract: This paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individuals in society. The need for such rules arises in different contexts, including the establishment of jurisdictions, the location of multiple public facilities, or the election of representative committees. We define a notion of allocation consistency requiring that each partial aspect of the global decision taken by society as a whole should be ratified by the group of agents who are directly concerned with this particular aspect. We investigate the possibility of designing allocation consistent rules which satisfy the Condorcet criterion and respect different notions of voluntarism.

Date: 2000-08-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/1322.pdf main text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Self-Selection Consistent Functions
Working Paper: Stable Condorcet Rules
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1322

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers from Econometric Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().