Information Sharing in Banking: A Collusive Device?
Thomas Gehrig and
Rune Stenbacka
Additional contact information
Rune Stenbacka: Swedish School of Economics
No 1837, Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers from Econometric Society
Abstract:
We show that information sharing among banks may serve as a collusive device. An informational sharing agreement is an a-priori commitment to reduce informational asymmetry between banks in future lending. Hence, information sharing agreements tend to increase the intensity of competition in future periods and, thus, reduce the value of informational rents in current competition. We contribute to the existing literature by emphasizing that a reduction in informational rents will also reduce the intensity of competition in the current period, thereby reducing competitive pressure in current credit markets. We provide a large class of economic environments, where a ban on information sharing is strictly preferred by society.
Date: 2000-08-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
Downloads: (external link)
http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/1837.pdf main text (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Information Sharing in Banking: A Collusive Device? (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1837
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers from Econometric Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().