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Aggregate Uncertainty in the Citizen-Candidate Model Yields Extremist Parties

Sandro Brusco and Jaideep Roy

CEDI Discussion Paper Series from Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University

Abstract: We extend the 'citizen candidate' model of party formation to allow for aggregate uncertainty over the distribution of preferenecs in order to address free entry in some earlier research on electoral competition with aggregate uncertainty with a fixed number of parties. We discuss and characterize the equilibrium set in this framework and show that two-party equilibria have 'extremist' parties, i.e., the party winning under a left-wing (right-wing) distribution is to the left (right) of the median of that distribution.

Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2008-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Aggregate uncertainty in the citizen candidate model yields extremist parties (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Aggregate Uncertainty in the Citizen Candidate Model Yields Extremist Parties (2007) Downloads
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