Reform of the United Nations Security Council: Equity and Efficiency
Matthew Gould () and
Matthew Rablen
CEDI Discussion Paper Series from Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University
Abstract:
Twenty years of negotiations over reform of the United nations Security Council (UNSC) are yet to bear fruit. We use recent advances in the theory of a priori voting power to present a formal quantitative appraisal of the "structural reforms" contained within eleven current reform proposals, and the separate effect of expansion of the UNSC membership. Only two reform proposals, the EU acting as a single entity, or a weakening of the veto power for permanent members, robustly dominate the status quo against our measures of equity and efficency. Several proposals may actually worsen the issues they ostensibly claim to resolve.
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2014-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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Related works:
Journal Article: Reform of the United Nations Security Council: equity and efficiency (2017) 
Working Paper: Reform of the United Nations Security Council: Equity and Efficiency (2016) 
Working Paper: Reform of the United Nations Security Council: Equity and Efficiency (2014) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edb:cedidp:14-01
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