GPs’ Payment Contracts and their Referral Policy

Begoña García Mariñoso and Izabela Jelovac
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Begoña García Mariñoso: School of Economic and Social Studies. University of East Anglia.

No 10, Documentos de trabajo - Analise Economica from IDEGA - Instituto Universitario de Estudios e Desenvolvemento de Galicia

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to compare the role of general practitioners in determining access to specialized and hospitalized health care in two different types of health care systems: Systems where a GP referral is compulsory for specialist/hospitalized attention and systems where this referral is only facultative. We model the dependence between the GPs’ diagnosis effort and referral practice, and concentrate on the optimal contracts that induce the best behaviour from the public insurers’ point of view with asymmetric information on both GP's diagnosis effort and diagnosis outcome. We show that the compulsory referral system is superior wherever the GP's incentives matter.

Keywords: health economics; referral; contracts; moral hazard. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 I18 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2000-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Journal of Health Economics, July 2003, pages 617-635

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edg:anecon:0010

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