Note on Optimal Auctions

Nicolás Figueroa and Vasiliki Skreta

No 232, Documentos de Trabajo from Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile

Abstract: This paper considers a general optimal auction problem, with many goods and with a buyer’s utility that can depend non-linearly in his type. We point out that incentive compatibility constraints may be binding even if virtual utilities are strictly increasing in the buyer’s type. More importantly, optimal mechanisms may involve randomizations between different allocations.

Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: A Note on Optimal Auctions (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edj:ceauch:232

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