(Group) Strategy-proofness and stability in many-to many marching markets
Antonio Romero-Medina and
Matteo Triossi ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina ()
No 332, Documentos de Trabajo from Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile
We study strategy-profness in many-to many matching markets. We prove that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers and both firms and workers have responsive preferences, the worker-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof and Pareto optimal. Absent any assumption on workers’ references, an Adjusted Serial Dictatorship among workers is stable, group strategy-proof and Pareto optimal for workers. In both cases, the set of stable matchings is a singleton. We show that acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets. Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D71, D78. Key words: Keywords: Many-to-many markets, Acyclicity, Stability, Group Strategy-proofness, singleton core.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-des
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.dii.uchile.cl/~cea/sitedev/cea/www/down ... E120170614160341.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edj:ceauch:332
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Documentos de Trabajo from Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().