Communication in Games of Incomplete Information: The Two-player Case

R. Vijay Krishna ()
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R. Vijay Krishna: http://rvijaykrishna.weebly.com/

Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series from Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh

Abstract: We study the effect of communication in two-person games of incomplete information. We show that any rational mediated communication mechanism satisfying a Nash domination condition can be implemented as the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a communication extension of the original game and ends in finite time with probability 1.

Pages: 19
Date: 2004-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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