Coordination of Mobile Labor

Jakub Steiner

Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series from Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh

Abstract: We study coordination failures in many simultaneously occurring coordination problems. Players encounter one of the problems but have the outside option of migrating to one of the remaining ones. Drawing on the global games approach, we show that such a mobile game has a unique equilibrium that allows us to examine comparative statics. The endogeneity of the outside option value and of the migration activity leads to non-monotonicity of welfare with respect to mobility friction; high mobility may hurt players. We apply these "general equilibrium" findings to the problem of the labor market during industrialization as described by Matsuyama.

Keywords: coordination; general equilibrium; global games; globalization; industrialization; mobility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28
Date: 2006-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Coordination of mobile labor (2008)
Working Paper: Coordination in a Mobile World (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edn:esedps:152

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