Immigration, Conflict and Redistribution

Santiago Sánchez-Pagés and Angel Solano Garcia ()

Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series from Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh

Abstract: We study how the possibility of a conflict between natives and immigrants shapes income redistribution in democracies. Conflict erupts when immigrants are given less than what they could obtain by resorting to confrontation. That in turn can make natives vote for lower tax rates and lower public spending. We show that income redistribution, both vertical (from the rich to the poor) and horizontal (from natives to migrants), decreases with the level of immigration. This is because the threat of conflict intensifies as the migrant population becomes bigger. Inequality softens the effect of immigration on tax rates but reduces horizontal redistribution. Despite the threat of conflict, the welfare of the native population unambiguously increases with the stock of migrants.

Keywords: conflict; income redistribution; natives; immigrants (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 F22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27
Date: 2010-06
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http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/papers/id195_esedps.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Immigration, Conflict, and Redistribution (2016)
Working Paper: Immigration, Conflict and Redistribution (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edn:esedps:195

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