A labor market with targeted wage offers

József Sákovics

Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series from Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh

Abstract: We model a market for highly skilled workers, such as the academic job market. The outputs of firm-worker matches are heterogeneous and common knowledge. Wage setting is synchronous with search: firms simultaneously make one personalized offer each to the worker of their choice. With large frictions (delay costs), efficient coordination is not possible, but for small frictions efficient matching with Diamond-type monopsony wages is an equilibrium.

Pages: 30
Date: 2011-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-lab
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Working Paper: A labor market with targeted wage offers (2011)
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