Suppliers of Priors: A Theory of Retailing Inspired by the Market for Chinese Antiquities

John Moore and Mingxiao Ye

Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series from Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh

Abstract: Adverse selection may thwart trade between an informed seller, who knows the probability p that an item of antiquity is genuine, and an uninformed buyer, who does not know p. The buyer might not be wholly uninformed, however. Suppose he can perform a simple inspection, a test of his own: the probability that an item passes the test is g if the item is genuine, but only f

Pages: 29
Date: 2013-10
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Working Paper: Suppliers of Priors: A Theory of Retailing Inspired by the Market for Chinese Antiquities (2013)
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