Personalized Prices and Uncertainty in Monopsony
Roberto Burguet () and
József Sákovics ()
Additional contact information
Roberto Burguet: http://www.iae.csic.es/investigadorPersonalAbout.php?idinvestigador=5&lang=ingPor%20ejemplo:%20http://example.edu/~tunombre
ESE Discussion Papers from Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh
We analyze personalized pricing by a monopsonist facing a finite number of ex ante identical, capacity constrained suppliers with privately known costs. When the distribution of costs is sufficiently smooth and regular, the buyer chooses to make the same offer to all suppliers, leading to a posted price. This price is lower than the classical monopsony price if the demand function is concave, and higher if the demand is convex. In the limit as the seller capacities tend to zero we obtain the classical monopsony price. Therefore, our model provides a decentralized micro-foundation for monopsony.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Personalized prices and uncertainty in monopsony (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edn:esedps:290
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in ESE Discussion Papers from Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh 31 Buccleuch Place, EH8 9JT, Edinburgh. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Research Office ().