Gender Norms in a Simple Model of Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility

Simon Clark

No 314, Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series from Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh

Abstract: I construct a simple matching model that nests transferable utility, nontransferable utility, and imperfectly transferable utility by showing that if the utility possibility frontier of a matched couple satisfies a homogeneity condition it has a CES form, with the elasticity of substitution sigma a measure of the degree of transferability. Taking sigma as exogenous, I analyse how transferability affects sorting and payoffs. Treating social norms as a source of imperfect transferability, I examine the effect of norms about gender roles within the household.

Keywords: Matching; marriage market; imperfectly transferable utility; social norms; gender norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D1 D9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2025-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-soc and nep-upt
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