Law, Property, and Marital Dissolution

Simon Clark

Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series from Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh

Abstract: This paper challenges the view that legal rights are not important in affecting whether people divorce, but it puts as much emphasis on property rights (given, for example, by the law on alimony) as on dissolution rights. The paper sets out two stylised models of marriage and examines the consequences of fuller compensation for economic sacrifices made during marriage. If the dominant economic issue in a marriage is who undertakes household tasks then a law giving fuller compensation makes divorce more likely. If the dominant issue is child custody, divorce is less likely.

Keywords: marriage; divorce; property rights; household production; child custody (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28
Date: 1999-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

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Journal Article: Law, Property, and Marital Dissolution (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edn:esedps:32

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