Learning in Perturbed Asymmetric Games

Josef Hofbauer and Ed Hopkins

Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series from Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh

Abstract: We investigate the stability of mixed strategy equilibria in 2 person (bimatrix) games under perturbed best response dynamics. A mixed equilibrium is asymptotically stable under all such dynamics if and only if the game is linearly equivalent to a zero sum game. In this case, the mixed equilibrium is also globally asymptotically stable. Global convergence to the set of perturbed equilibria is shown also for (rescaled) partnership games (also know as games of identical interest). Some applications of these results to stochastic learning models are given.

Keywords: games; learning; best response dynamics; stochastic fictitious play; mixed strategy equilibria; zero sum games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16
Date: 2000-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Learning in perturbed asymmetric games (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edn:esedps:53

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