Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information
Martin Cripps and
Jonathan Thomas ()
Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series from Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh
The paper analyzes the Nash equilibria of two-person discounted repeated games with one-sided incomplete information and known own payoffs. If the informed player is arbitrarily patient relative to the uninformed player, then the characterization for the informed player's payoffs is essentially the same as that in the undiscounted case. This implies that even small amounts of incomplete information can lead to a discontinuous change in the equilibrium payoff set. For the case of equal discount factors, however, and under an assumption that strictly individually rational payoffs exist, a result akin to the Folk Theorem holds when a complete information game is perturbed by a small amount of incomplete information.
Keywords: reputation; Folk theorem; repeated games; incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information (2003)
Working Paper: Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edn:esedps:76
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