Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Two-sided Matching

Simon Clark

Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series from Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh

Abstract: This paper analyses a sufficient condition for uniqueness of equilibrium in two-sided matching with non-transferable utility. The condition is easy to interpret, being based on the notion that a person's characteristics both form the basis of their attraction to the opposite sex, and determine their own sexual preferences.

Keywords: uniqueness; matching; marriage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17
Date: 2002-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edn:esedps:84

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