Collective vs. Individual Sale of TV Rights in League Sports

Sonia Falconieri, Frederic Palomino and József Sákovics

Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series from Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh

Abstract: In many countries, the collective sale of TV rights by sports leagues has been challenged by the antitrust authorities. In several cases, however, leagues won in court, on the ground that sport cannot be considered a standard good. In this paper, we investigate the conditions under which the sale of TV rights collectively by sports leagues, rather than individually by teams, is preferred from a social welfare viewpoint. We find that collective sale is socially preferable when leagues are small, relatively homogeneous in terms of clout and where teams get little performance-related revenues.

Keywords: talent; competitive balance; revenue sharing; broadcasting rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L10 L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24
Date: 2002-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-spo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Collective vs Individual Sale of TV Rights in League Sports (2002)
Working Paper: Collective vs Individual Sale of TV Rights in League Sports (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edn:esedps:85

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