Matching and Sorting with Horizontal Heterogeneity

Simon Clark

Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series from Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh

Abstract: This paper examine a class of two-sided matching problems with non-transferable utility. Agents are horizontally differentiated, and each would prefer to be matched with a similar partner; in short, "like attracts like". Although such preferences imply a unique stable matching, the degree of assortment in equilibrium is found to depend critically on the distribution of characteristics among the two sexes. In particular, the greater the difference between men and women, the greater the tendency to negative assortment. Constraints on who can match with whom may improve welfare and we interpret this as a theory of social stratification.

Keywords: matching; sorting; uniqueness; horizontal heterogeneity; marriage market; social stratification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45
Date: 2003-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edn:esedps:94

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