On the Social Efficiency of Conflict

Santiago Sánchez-Pagés

Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series from Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh

Abstract: In sharp contrast with the economic literature on conflict, this paper shows that confrontation may be efficiency enhancing. Conditions are derived under which a contest over the exclusive control of a resource Pareto dominates open access. When the population size is big enough or production exhibits strong decreasing returns to scale, agents unanimously prefer to engage in conflict.

Keywords: commons; exclusion contest; open-access resource (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6
Date: 2005-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/papers/id97_esedps.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: On the social efficiency of conflict (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edn:esedps:97

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