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Affirmative Action Policy and Effort Levels. Sequential-Move Contest Game Argument

Andrzej Kwiatkowski

No 2010-83, SIRE Discussion Papers from Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE)

Abstract: In this paper we analyse a simple two-person sequential-move contest game with heterogeneous players. Assuming that the heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination, we study the effects of implementation of affirmative action policy, which tackles this heterogeneity by compensating discriminated players, and compare them with the situation in which the heterogeneity is ignored and the contestants are treated equally. In our analysis we consider different orders of moves. We show that the order of moves of contestants is a very important factor in determination of the effects of the implementation of the affirmative action policy. We also prove that in such cases a significant role is played by the level of the heterogeneity of individuals. In particular, in contrast to the present-in-the-literature predictions, we demonstrate that as a consequence of the interplay of these two factors, the response to the implementation of the affirmative action policy option may be the decrease in the total equilibrium effort level of the contestants in comparison to the unbiased contest game.

Keywords: Asymmetric contest; sequential-move contest; affi rmative action; discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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