Spillovers of Equal Treatment in Wage Offers

Kawamura Kohei and József, Sákovics
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: József Sákovics

No 2013-15, SIRE Discussion Papers from Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE)

Abstract: We analyse a labour matching model with wage posting, where re flecting institutional constraints firms cannot differentiate their wage offers within certain subsets of workers. Inter alia, we find that the presence of impersonal wage offers leads to wage compression, which propagates to the wages for high productivity workers who receive personalised offers.

Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
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Related works:
Journal Article: Spillovers of Equal Treatment in Wage Offers (2014)
Working Paper: Spillovers of Equal Treatment in Wage Offers (2013)
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