Non-Cooperative Asymptotic Oligopoly in Economies with Infinitely Many Commodities

Sayantan Ghosal and Simone Tonin

No 2015-23, SIRE Discussion Papers from Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE)

Abstract: In this paper, we extend the non-cooperative analysis of oligopoly to exchange economics with infinitely many commodities by using strategic market games. This setting can be interpreted as a model of oligopoly with differentiated commodities by using the Hotelling line. We prove the existence of an "active" Cournot-Nash equilibrium and show that, when traders are replicated, the price vector and the allocation converge to the Walras equilibrium. We examine how the notion of oligopoly extends to our setting with a countable infinity of commodities by distinguishing between asymptotic oligopolists and asymptotic price-takes. We illustrate these notions via a number of examples.

Date: 2014-09
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Working Paper: Non-Cooperative Asymptotic Oligopoly in Economies with Infinitely Many Commodities (2014)
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