Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets

Benjamin Lester, Ludo Visschers and Ronald Wolthoff

No 2015-36, SIRE Discussion Papers from Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE)

Abstract: In a market in which sellers compete by posting mechanisms, we study how the properties of the meeting technology affect the mechanism that sellers select. In general, sellers have incentive to use mechanisms that are socially efficient. In our environment, sellers achieve this by posting an auction with a reserve price equal to their own valuation, along with a transfer that is paid by (or to) all buyers with whom the seller meets. However, we define a novel condition on meeting technologies, which we call 'invariance', and show that the transfer is equal to zero if and only if the meeting technology satisfies this condition.

Keywords: search frictions; matching function; meeting technology; competing mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets (2015)
Working Paper: Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets (2014)
Working Paper: Meeting Technologies and Optimal Trading Mechanisms in Competitive Search Markets (2014)
Working Paper: Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets (2014)
Working Paper: Meeting Technologies and Optimal Trading Mechanisms in Competitive Search Markets (2014)
Working Paper: Meeting Technologies and Optimal Trading Mechanisms in Competitive Search Marks (2014)
Working Paper: Meeting Technologies and Optimal Trading Mechanisms in Competitive Search Markets (2014)
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