Power in the Design of Constitutional Rules

Mika Widgrén

No 23, European Economy Group Working Papers from European Economy Group

Abstract: This paper examines different ways of measuring power and the use of these measures in the context of the European Union. The paper deals with classical power indices of co-operative games and more recent non-cooperative a priori measures. Special emphasis of the paper is in inter-institutional balance of power, Nice reforms and eastern enlargement.

Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2003
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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