EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Quantity Competition vs. Price Competition under Optimal Subsidy in a Mixed Duopoly

Marcella Scrimitore ()

EERI Research Paper Series from Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels

Abstract: This paper reconsiders the literature on the irrelevance of privatization in mixed markets, addressing both quantity and price competition in a duopoly with differentiated products. By allowing for partially privatizing a state-controlled firm, we explore competition under different timings of firms’ moves and derive the conditions under which an optimal subsidy allows to achieve maximum efficiency. We show that, while the ownership of the controlled firm is irrelevant when firms play simultaneously, it matters when firms compete sequentially, requiring the leader to be publicly-owned for an optimal subsidy to restore the first-best allocation, irrespective of the mode of competition. The paper also focuses on the extent to which a subsidy is needed to attain the social optimum, highlighting the equivalence between a price (quantity) game with public leadership or simultaneous moves and a quantity (price) game with private leadership.

Keywords: Cournot; Bertrand; privatization; optimal subsidy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H44 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-09-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.eeri.eu/documents/wp/EERI_RP_2012_15.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eei:rpaper:eeri_rp_2012_15

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in EERI Research Paper Series from Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Julia van Hove ().

 
Page updated 2023-01-19
Handle: RePEc:eei:rpaper:eeri_rp_2012_15