Leviathanian Fiscal Competition in Heterogeneous Country
Sergey Kokovin and
EERC Working Paper Series from EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS
In this normative study of fiscal competition mechanism, we allow for various schemes of taxation, various mobility of tax-base, non-identical regions, and nonbenevolent governments. We examine the fundamental trade-o® between “negative externalities” of the competition and benefits from its budget discipline. Some indicators of regional “rivalry” and “non-benevolence” are constructed for diagnosing marginal “over-taxing” in any region. It enables also “in-large” comparison of fiscal regimes. Under some restrictions on the country’s heterogeneity in tax rates, marginal “over-taxing” at competition signifies that switching to certain sort of tax co-ordination would deteriorate welfare.
JEL-codes: D43 H32 H73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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