Strategic choice of trade policy instruments
Valentin Melnik ()
EERC Working Paper Series from EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS
What is the optimum mix of trade policy instruments? Usually governments choose among such instruments as quotas, tariffs, explicit or implicit subsidies. The goal of the project is to consider the possibility of a simultaneous use by the government of quotas (and corresponding license fees) and tariffs. The combined use of quotas and tariffs is better — from the efficiency point of view — than a policy based on simple quotas or simple tariffs. The qualitative outcomes of the analysis depend on the type of government behavior (revenue or public welfare maximization), and market structure. The study aims at improving our understanding of the link between government intervention — the optimal mix of trade policy instruments — and competition in the home goods market.
JEL-codes: C72 D43 F00 F12 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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