Banking regulation and financial stability
Bakirov Rustam () and
Grishan Maxim ()
EERC Working Paper Series from EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS
Panic and a massive withdrawal of deposits triggered by an expectation of bankruptcy may force the bank to sell off valuable assets, causing sizeable losses and, in some cases, closure of an initially healthy financial institution. The traditional way of preventing bank runs has to do with the imposition of various restrictions on the bank’s activity. Yet, restrictions and regulations can vary. Based on a theoretical model, the authors analyze the effect of alternative banking regulation instruments on the stability of the Russian financial system.
JEL-codes: E00 G00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 59 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg and nep-tra
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