Public procurement versus laissez-faire: evidence from household waste collection

Jaakko Meriläinen () and Janne Tukiainen

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We document that switching from laissez-faire production to public procurement in residential waste collection in Finland reduces the number of firms active in the local market, but induces a statistically significant and large decrease in unit prices on average. While public procurement, thus, seems to be desirable from the citizens’ perspective, not all municipalities adopt public procurement. We provide descriptive evidence that municipal council composition is associated with the chosen regime. This suggests that local politics may be one obstacle for the efficient provision of local public goods.

Keywords: free markets; waste collection; public procurement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 D72 H76 L13 L85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2019-02-20
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Published in CESifo Economic Studies, 20, February, 2019, 65(4), pp. 446-463. ISSN: 1610-241X

Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/100216/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Public Procurement versus Laissez-Faire: Evidence from Household Waste Collection (2019)
Working Paper: Public Procurement versus Laissez-Faire: Evidence from Household Waste Collection (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:100216

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