Institutional corruption and election fraud: evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan

Michael Callen and James D. Long

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We investigate the relationship between political networks, weak institutions, and election fraud during the 2010 parliamentary election in Afghanistan combining: (i) data on political connections between candidates and election officials; (ii) a nationwide controlled evaluation of a novel monitoring technology; and (iii) direct measurements of aggregation fraud. We find considerable evidence of aggregation fraud in favor of connected candidates and that the announcement of a new monitoring technology reduced theft of election materials by about 60 percent and vote counts for connected candidates by about 25 percent. The results have implications for electoral competition and are potentially actionable for policymakers.

JEL-codes: C93 D02 D72 K42 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2015-01-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

Published in American Economic Review, 1, January, 2015, 105(1), pp. 354 - 381. ISSN: 0002-8282

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Related works:
Journal Article: Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:102931

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