Inequalities in student to course match: evidence from linked administrative data
Lindsey Macmillan (),
Richard Murphy () and
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
This paper examines inequalities in the match between student quality and university quality using linked administrative data from schools, universities and tax authorities. We analyse two measures of match at the university-subject (course) level, based on student academic attainment, and graduate earnings. We find that students from lower socio-economic groups systematically undermatch for both measures across the distribution of attainment, with particularly stark socio-economic gaps for the most undermatched. While there are negligible gender gaps in academic match, high-attaining women systematically undermatch in terms of expected earnings, largely driven by subject choice.
Keywords: higher education; educational economics; college choice; mismatch; undermatch (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I22 I23 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur
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Working Paper: Inequalities in student to course match: evidence from linked administrative data (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:103413
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