Monopsony in labor markets: a review
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
Researchers’ interest in monopsony has increased in recent years. This article reviews the accumulating evidence that employers have considerable monopsony power. It summarizes the application of this idea to explaining the impact of minimum wages and immigration, in anti-trust, and in understanding how to model the determinants of earnings in matched employer–employee data sets and the implications for inequality and the labor share.
Keywords: monospsony; imperfect competition; labor markets; minimum wages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gen and nep-ltv
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Published in Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 17, February, 2020. ISSN: 0019-7939
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:103482
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