The urban wage premium in imperfect labor markets
Hirsch Boris,
Elke Jahn,
Alan Manning and
Michael Oberfichtner
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
Abstract:
Using administrative data for West Germany, this paper investigates whether part of the urban wage premium stems from greater competition in denser labor markets. We show that employers possess less wage-setting power in denser markets. We further document that an important part of the observed urban wage premia can be explained by greater competition in denser labor markets.
JEL-codes: J31 J42 R23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2020-11-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-geo and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)
Published in Journal of Human Resources, 10, November, 2020. ISSN: 0022-166X
Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/106728/ Open access version. (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: The Urban Wage Premium in Imperfect Labor Markets (2022) 
Working Paper: The urban wage premium in imperfect labour markets (2019) 
Working Paper: The urban wage premium in imperfect labour markets (2019) 
Working Paper: The urban wage premium in imperfect labour markets (2019) 
Working Paper: The Urban Wage Premium in Imperfect Labour Markets (2016) 
Working Paper: The urban wage premium in imperfect labour markets (2016) 
Working Paper: The urban wage premium in imperfect labour markets (2015) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:106728
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