Political fragmentation and government stability: evidence from local governments in Spain

Felipe Carozzi, Davide Cipullo and Luca Repetto

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This paper studies how political fragmentation affects government stability. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that each additional party with representation in the local parliament increases the probability that the incumbent government is unseated by 5 percentage points. The entry of an additional party affects stability by reducing the probability of a single-party majority and increasing the instability of governments when such a majority is not available. We interpret our results in light of a bargaining model of coalition formation featuring government instability.

Keywords: government; stability; fragmentation; no-confidence votes; bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D72 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2022-04-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dem and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1, April, 2022, 14(2), pp. 23 - 50. ISSN: 1945-7782

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/108934/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Political Fragmentation and Government Stability: Evidence from Local Governments in Spain (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:108934

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