Persuasion with endogenous misspecified beliefs

Kfir Eliaz, Ran Spiegler and Heidi Thysen

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We study a two-action, two-state pure persuasion game in which the receiver has non-rational expectations. The sender can add ambiguity to his message by pooling it with other messages. This can be likened to selective redaction of the original message. The receiver knows the sender's message strategy but not his redaction strategy, and uses only the former to draw inferences from the redacted message. We characterize the highest probability of persuasion attainable by the sender under these conditions.

Keywords: misspecified beliefs; non-rational expectations; persuasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
Date: 2021-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in European Economic Review, 1, May, 2021, 134. ISSN: 0014-2921

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Journal Article: Persuasion with endogenous misspecified beliefs (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:109842

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