The impact of bounded subadditivity on administrative behaviour among public and private workers

Paolo Belardinelli, Nicola Bellé and Paola Cantarelli

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We use a mixed-methods sequential explanatory design to explore whether and how bounded subadditivity, and the resulting certainty effect, may lead public and private employees to prioritize their activities in ways that are suboptimal for their organizations. In a randomized controlled trial, private sector workers were more likely to join a project to which they were able to provide a small contribution that would turn the probability of success into certainty rather than an alternative project in which their participation would make success twice as likely but not certain. This behaviour, which is consistent with the principle of bounded subadditivity, was not observed among public workers in our sample, who did not show any preference for either project. A qualitative inquiry suggests that the observed difference in susceptibility to bounded subadditivity between public and private employees resonates with public service motivation, self-determination theory and identity economics.

Keywords: administrative behavior; bounded subadditivity; public versus private workers; mixed methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J01 R14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2021-12-01
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Published in Public Administration, 1, December, 2021, 99(4), pp. 679 - 693. ISSN: 0033-3298

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:110449

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