Rationality, preference satisfaction and anomalous intentions: why rational choice theory is not self-defeating

Roberto Fumagalli

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: The critics of rational choice theory (henceforth, RCT) frequently claim that RCT is self-defeating in the sense that agents who abide by RCT’s prescriptions are less successful in satisfying their preferences than they would be if they abided by some normative theory of choice other than RCT. In this paper, I combine insights from philosophy of action, philosophy of mind and the normative foundations of RCT to rebut this often-made criticism. I then explicate the implications of my thesis for the wider philosophical debate concerning the normativity of RCT for both ideal agents who can form and revise their intentions instantly without cognitive costs and real-life agents who have limited control over the formation and the dynamics of their own intentions.

Keywords: decision-making; intentions; normativity; preference satisfaction; rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2021-10-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-upt
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Published in Theory and Decision, 1, October, 2021, 91(3), pp. 337 - 356. ISSN: 0040-5833

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