Proxy-led accountability for natural resource extraction in rentier states

Teresa Kramarz, Michael Mason and Lena Partzsch

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: The resource curse literature suggests that, in fragile states dependent on natural resource rents, structures of public accountability are weak because of an elite-controlled political economy indifferent to social and ecological interests. We examine accountability claims made by non-domestic proxy actors, holding governments and corporations accountable on behalf of communities adversely affected by natural resources extraction. This conceptualization is suggested by proxy-led transnational mobilization against mining-related damage in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We identify an ‘hourglass’ structure of proxy actor engagement with affected communities: In a first phase, proxies rely on public mechanisms to define standards remotely. In a second phase, proxies ‘narrow’ the gap by seeking compliance information from affected communities. However, in a third phase this gap ‘widens’ again when proxies remotely seek sanctions against responsible actors. We discuss the applicability of this heuristic framework to proxy-led accountability practices in other natural resource-dependent rentier states.

Keywords: proxy accountability; resource extraction; rentier states; Democratic Republic of the Congo (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J01 R14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-env
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Environmental Politics, 2023, 32(1), pp. 113 - 134. ISSN: 0964-4016

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:113757

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