Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard

Daniel Gottlieb () and Humberto Moreira

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We study a principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection. Risk-neutral agents with limited liability have arbitrary private information about the distribution of outputs and the cost of effort. We show that under a multiplicative separability condition, the optimal mechanism offers a single contract. This condition holds, for example, when output is binary. If the principal’s payoff must also satisfy free disposal and the distribution of outputs has the monotone likelihood ratio property, the mechanism offers a single debt contract. Our results generalize if the output distribution is “close” to multiplicatively separable. Our model suggests that offering a single contract may be optimal in environments with adverse selection and moral hazard when agents are risk neutral and have limited liability.

Keywords: principal-agent problem; contract theory; mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2022-07-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-hrm, nep-mic and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Theoretical Economics, 1, July, 2022, 17(3), pp. 1357 – 1401. ISSN: 1933-6837

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