Financial choice and financial information
Péter Kondor and
Botond Koszegi
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
Abstract:
We analyze the implications of increases in the selection of, and information about, derivative financial products in a model in which investors neglect informational differences between themselves and issuers. We assume that investors receive information that is noisy and inferior to issuers' information, and that issuers can select the set of underlying assets when designing a security. In contrast to the received wisdom that diversification is helpful, we show that when custom-designed diversification across a large number of underlying assets is possible, then expected utility approaches negative infinity. Even beyond this limiting case, any expansion in choice induced by either an increase in the maximum number of assets underlying a security, or an increase in the number of assets from which the underlying can be selected, Pareto-lowers welfare. Furthermore, under reasonable conditions an improvement in investor information Pareto-lowers welfare by giving investors the false impression that they can spot good deals. An increase in competition between issuers does not increase welfare, and even increases investors' incentive to acquire welfare reducing information. Restricting the set of underlying assets the issuer can use-a kind of standardization-raises welfare, and once this policy is adopted, increasing investor information becomes beneficial.
JEL-codes: G10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2017-05-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:118973
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