Defeasance of control rights

Carsten Bienz, Antoine Faure-Grimaud and Zsuzsanna Fluck

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We analyze one frequent clause in bonds, covenant defeasance. Covenant defeasance allows the issuer to remove the bond's covenants by placing the remaining payments with a trustee in escrow to be paid out on schedule. We provide theoretical justification for this option and show empirically that it allows inclusion of more covenants in bond issues. We highlight characteristics that make issuers likely to add a defeasance clause. In line with the model's prediction, the empirical analysis documents 13-24 basis points yield reduction for defeasible bonds - annual saving of about $1m, or $11m over the life of the average bond.

Keywords: corporate bonds; action-limiting covenants; defeasance option; control rights; bond yields (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 G12 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 53 pages
Date: 2011-03-13
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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/119069/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Defeasance of Control Rights (2011)
Working Paper: The Defeasance of Control Rights (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:119069

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