Optimal managerial remuneration and firm-level diversification

Erlend Nier

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: In a model that exhibits both moral hazard and hidden information on the part of the manager different remuneration schemes are discussed and the optimal contract between financial investor and manager is derived. Assuming the manager is risk-neutral and protected by limited liability, a benefit from diversification is shown to exist even though the projects which the manager develops are technologically unrelated and choices made on one project do not constrain the choices on any other project.

JEL-codes: D82 G31 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 1997-07-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:119172

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