Managing other people's money: an agency theory in financial management industry

Dimitris Papadimitriou, Konstantinos Tokis, Georgios Vichos and Panos Mourdoukoutas

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We build an active asset management model to study the interplay between the career concerns of a manager and prevailing market conditions. We show that fund managers overinvest in market-neutral strategies, as these have a reputational benefit. This benefit is smaller in bull markets, when investors expect more managers to use high-beta strategies, making their performance less informative about their ability than in bear markets. Consequently, fund flows that follow high-beta strategies are less responsive to the fund's performance, and flow-performance sensitivity is higher in bear markets than in bull markets.

Keywords: Paul; Woolley; Centre; at; the; LSE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G11 G20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-06-26
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Published in Journal of Financial Research, 26, June, 2023. ISSN: 0270-2592

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Journal Article: Managing other people's money: An agency theory in financial management industry (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:119872

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