The Principal Principle and the contingent a priori

Richard Bradley

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: In Chapter 6 of Objects of Credence, Anna Mahtani argues that the opacity of credence raises difficulties for the Principal Principle and proposes a revised principle relating credence and chance that avoids it. In this comment on her book, I both defend Mahtani’s proposed principle against a charge of triviality and argue that the opacity of belief does not threaten the role of chance in guiding credence.

Keywords: credence; Principal Principle; chance; indeterminism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
Date: 2024-07-31
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Published in Economics and Philosophy, 31, July, 2024, 40(2), pp. 472 - 477. ISSN: 0266-2671

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